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Criminal Law. State v. Hampton-Boyd, 253 A.3d 418 (R.I.
2021). The trial justice retains significant discretion to instruct the
jury as consistent with the law. As part of that determination, the
trial justice can consider whether jury instructions or trial advocacy
is the best forum for explaining cross-racial identification to the
jury. Additionally, notice of the State’s intention to use the habitual
offender sentencing enhancement can be given at a pretrial conference, even if it is more than forty-five days following arraignment.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In the early morning hours on April 8, 2017, the victim, Rafael
Fernandez (Fernandez) was robbed at gunpoint by the defendant,
Gregory Hampton-Boyd (the defendant), outside of the Masheratti
Lounge (the club) in Providence, Rhode Island.1 Fernandez suffered three gunshot wounds after a brief struggle with the defendant.2 The defendant blocked Fernandez’s entrance into the vehicle
after Fernandez refused to give the defendant his gold chain.3 Despite his injuries, Fernandez attempted to pursue his attacker but
stopped when he heard gunshots coming from across the street and
saw who he believed to be a friend of the defendant.4
An officer in the area heard the shots and began pursuit of a
dark sedan fleeing the scene.5 After another officer picked up the
pursuit, the passenger of the sedan exited the moving vehicle and
fled on foot.6 The pursuing officer continued to follow the sedan
while another began to follow the passenger on foot.7 Before he
could pursue the fugitive, the officer noticed the passenger, a black
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male, dropped a gold chain and a firearm.8 The officer decided to
forego pursuit and waited for the Bureau of Criminal Investigation.9 The passenger, who lost his shoe while exiting the vehicle,
was apprehended and identified as the defendant.10
Consequently, in an interview at the hospital shortly after the
shooting, Fernandez described the robber as a black man and the
other shooter as a Puerto Rican man.11 Fernandez later provided
the police with a more specific description of his assailant, stating
that he was “a black male, around 5 feet 10 inches tall, with a thin
build, clean cut with a beard, and wearing a long gold chain with a
Jesus head medallion.”12
Upon his release from the hospital, a club employee sent Fernandez video from inside the club on the night of the robbery, which
showed the defendant.13 Fernandez also identified the defendant
as his assailant when the police showed him a photo array days
later.14 During his formal statement, Fernandez informed police
that he was “100 percent sure” the defendant was the individual
who tried to rob him and signed a statement that supported that
claim.15
On June 29, 2017, the defendant was indicted on one count of
first-degree robbery, among other charges.16 The state, on September 7, 2017, served the defendant with notice that he would be subject to an additional sentence upon conviction as a habitual offender
because the defendant had four prior convictions in Massachusetts.17 The defendant filed a motion to preclude the state from
pursuing the habitual offender statute against him but the trial
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 421–22.
16. Id. The defendant was also indicted for conspiracy to commit robbery,
two counts of carrying a pistol without a license, possession of a firearm despite
a prior conviction of a crime of violence, knowing possession of a stolen firearm,
assault with a dangerous weapon, and being armed with a stolen firearm during the assault. The court eventually dismissed the charges relating to conspiracy, knowing possession of a stolen firearm, and being armed with a stolen
firearm during the assault.
17. Id.
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justice denied it, holding it was not ripe until after the jury announced its verdict.18
At trial, Fernandez identified the defendant as his attacker, an
allegation, along with Fernandez’s out-of-court identifications, that
the defendant did not refute during the proceeding. The defendant
requested that the trial justice instruct the jury on cross-racial eyewitness identification, but the trial justice declined, instead finding
that his own eyewitness identification instruction was sufficient.19
The trial justice’s instruction, in relevant part, read that the jury
“may consider…any ethnic or racial differences between the witness and the assailant” in assessing the reliability of an eyewitness.20
Subsequently, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in injury, and one charge
of carrying a pistol without a license.21 Pursuant to a stipulation,
the trial justice also found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by an individual convicted of a crime of violence.22
The defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied by the trial justice following the verdict.23 The trial justice, partially based on the
defendant’s status as a habitual offender, rendered a lengthy sentence.24
The defendant appealed his conviction to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the trial justice erred in refusing to instruct the jury on cross-racial identification and that the defendant
was not given adequate notice of the state’s intention to use the habitual offender enhancement.25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court, through an opinion authored
by Justice Erin Lynch Prata, affirmed the trial justice’s holdings on
the defendant’s motions. The Court held that the trial justice
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correctly instructed the jury on cross-racial eyewitness identification, noting that the trial justice retains significant discretion when
instructing the jury. Additionally, the Court held that the state
gave proper notice to the defendant of its intention to seek an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender statute.
A. Jury Instruction
The Court began its inquiry by noting that jury instructions are
reviewed de novo.26 The Court acknowledged that “[w]hile a defendant may request that the trial justice include particular language in the jury instructions, the trial justice is not required to use
any specific words or phrases when instructing the jury— so long
as the instructions actually given ‘adequately cover the law.’”27 The
Court concluded its outline of the applicable standard of review by
acknowledging that “[a] trial justice’s refusal to grant a request for
jury instruction is not reversible error if the requested charge is
fairly covered in the general charge.”28
The Court then applied these jury instruction principles to
cross-racial identification principles to the case at hand.29 The
Court explained that contrary to the defendant’s cited case law from
other jurisdictions, Rhode Island has never required a trial justice
to instruct a jury on cross-racial identification.30 The Court recognized that in State v. Davis, it stated that “the better practice would
be for courts to provide the jury with more comprehensive instructions when eyewitness testimony is an issue.”31 While this quote
seemingly favors the defendant, the Court pointed out that this was
declared “aspirational dictum” in State v. Fuentes.32 The Court further stated that the trial justice retains significant discretion to determine whether the instruction is warranted.33

26. Id. (citing State v. Fuentes, 162 A.3d 638, 644 (R.I. 2017)).
27. Id. (first quoting State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 477 (R.I. 2010));
(then quoting State v. Palmer, 962 A.2d 758, 764, 769 (R.I. 2009)).
28. Id. (first quoting State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1008 (R.I. 2005));
(then quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1044 (R.I. 2004)).
29. Hampton-Boyd, 253 A.3d at 424.
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting State v. Davis, 131 A.3d 679, 697 (R.I. 2016)).
32. Id. (quoting State v. Fuentes, 162 A.3d 638, 644 (R.I. 2017)).
33. Id.
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As part of its affirmation of the trial court decision, the Court
agreed with the trial justice’s findings that there is no requirement
to provide the jury with such an instruction.34 The Court agreed
with the trial justice that the instruction may take away from the
jury’s fact-finding role and that advocacy is the best method to
make this point to the jury.35 The Court made this finding by relying on State v. Hadrick, which found that a similar instruction
“might be construed as commentary on the quality or credibility of
particular evidence.”36
The Court did acknowledge that cross-racial identification has
undergone a period of recent wide-spread acceptance.37 Nevertheless, despite this period of change, the Court dismissed the defendant’s argument that its exclusion was in error by citing substantial
evidence that pointed towards the defendant’s guilt.38 The defendant was apprehended while wearing just one shoe with the other
shoe being recovered near where the passenger fled the vehicle.39
Additionally, multiple police officers identified the defendant as the
individual who fled the vehicle.40
The Court did, however, express concern over the way the instruction was given.41 While not finding it to be a reversible error,
the Court wrote that “simply stating that the jury may consider differences in race and ethnicity without further context for that instruction is not an appropriate charge.”42 The Court noted that, in
the future, trial justices need to instruct juries on how to consider
differences in race for eyewitness identification.43 This can be accomplished by justices working with counsel to determine what the
appropriate contextual remarks must contain.44 The Court affirmed that the instruction was without error because both parties
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Id. (citing State v. Hadrick, 523 A.2d 441, 444 (R.I. 1987)).
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had the chance to impeach the identification in their closing arguments.45
For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirmed the trial justice’s
jury instructions because they adequately covered the law “as it existed at the time.”46
B. Due Process
Next, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
state did not provide adequate notice of its intention to use the habitual offender sentencing enhancements.47 The Court reviewed
the trial justice’s decision de novo.48 The defendant asserted that
because the state failed to notify him of their intentions within
forty-five days of his arraignment, the state lost the opportunity to
use the enhancement.49 Though the Court acknowledged that adequate notice helps the defendant understand the full range of potential punishments, the Court declined to adopt the defendant’s
position.50
The Court pointed to State v. Peterson, which held that “the
language from 12-19-21, ‘but in no case later than the date of the
pretrial conference,’ allowed for extensions to the forty-five-day period set forth in the statute.”51 In light of this, the Court held that
notice given at the pretrial conference complied with the Court’s
precedent and the defendant’s right to due process was not infringed upon.52
COMMENTARY

Cross-racial identification is a serious concern in cases where
eyewitness identification is essential. In times where racial disparities are at the forefront of social debate, the judiciary must be
weary of the high risk that eyewitness misidentification poses.
Here, that risk seems minimal. The defendant was identified by
several police officers, was seen on club surveillance video, and was
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 427.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Peterson, 722 A.2d 259, 264–65 (R.I. 1998)).
Id. at 428.
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apprehended with only one shoe; the matching shoe was found
where the passenger fled the vehicle. This wealth of evidence
helped decrease the jury’s reliance on Fernandez’s testimony. Because of this, the trial justice exercised proper discretion given to
him to instruct the jury as consistent with the law. Thus, it can be
easily argued that the Supreme Court correctly affirmed the trial
justice’s instruction.
Moreover, the Court correctly applied the law as articulated in
Peterson to the facts of this case.53 The state properly provided the
defendant with notice of its intention to seek the habitual offender
sentencing enhancement. Prior case law shows that the defendant
is entitled to notice at any time before the date of his pretrial conference. Though this notice surely decreased the effectiveness of
the defendant’s preparations for the conference, it was consistent
with the state’s obligations. The Court correctly called on the legislature to take up the issue of notice so that a defendant would be
more adequately prepared for the hearing. Despite this, the Court
appropriately applied the law as it was in effect at the time.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a trial justice maintains the authority to instruct the jury on cross-racial identification
within his or her discretion so long as that instruction adequately
covers the applicable law. The Court further held that notice delivered to the defendant on the date of a pretrial conference is sufficient to comport with due process requirements.
Brian W. Murphy

53. 733 A.2d at 264–65.

